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CRIMINAL LAW
DISMISSAL WITH OR WITHOUT PREJUDICE UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL
ACT: A PROPOSED INTERPRETATION
MARC I. STEINBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Federal Speedy Trial Act' became
effective on July 1, 1975, there has been much
commentary criticizing the Act by both law re-
view writers2 and the courts.3 While many of
these criticisms have great merit, their value is
merely academic, and the important inquiry
confronting the courts is how certain provisions
of the Act should be construed. This article
shall propose a suggested interpretation of sec-
tion 3162(a)(1)(2), which has been acknowl-
edged by commentators to be the most contro-
versial section of the Act.4 This provision pro-
vides the court with discretionary authority to
dismiss a case either with or without prejudice
when the Act's time periods are violated.'
In order better to comprehend this provision
within the framework of the Act, one must be
aware of the relevant sections. First, the Act
* A.B., University of Michigan; J.D., University of
California, Los Angeles; Graduate Fellow LL.M.
Candidate, Yale University; Member, California Bar.
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1970).
2See, e.g., Hansen & Reed, The Speedy Trial Act of
1974 in Constitutional Perspective, 47 Miss. L.J. 365,
415-17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hansen & Reed];
Kozinski, That Can of Worms: The Speedy Trial Act, 62
A.B.AJ. 862, 862-64 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Ko-
zinski]; Russ & Mandelkern, The Speedy Trial Act of
1974: A Trap for the Unwary Practitioner, 2 J. CRIM.
DEF. 1, 27-29 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Russ &
Mandelkern]; Steinberg, Right to Speedy Trial: The
Constitutional Right and its Applicability to the Speedy Trial
Act of 1974, 66 J. CRIM. L. & C. 229, 235-39 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Steinberg].
' See, e.g., United States v. Tirasso, 532 F.2d 1298
(9th Cir. 1976), where the court stated: "It is discour-
aging that our highly refined and complex system of
criminal justice is suddenly faced with implementing
a statute that is so inartfully drawn as this one." Id. at
1301. For commentary on the Tirasso case, see 44
U.S.L.W. 1161 (April 20, 1976); Kozinski, supra note
2, at 864.
' See Hansen & Reed, supra note 2, at 415; Russ &
Mandelkern, supra note 2, at 24.
18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1)(2).
requires that an accused be brought to trial
within definite time periods: filing of the indict-
ment or information must occur within thirty
days after arrest,' arraignment must be held
within ten days thereafter,7 and, upon a plea of
not guilty, trial must be held within the follow-
ing sixty days.' Hence, from the date of arrest,
the accused must be tried within 100 days.' To
enable the courts to adhere to this schedule, the
above time limits will not become effective until
July 1, 1979.10 Until that time, three sets of time
periods, imposed in yearly succession (the first
began on July 1, 1976), will implement the
Act. l'
Second, the Act provides for a number of
justifiable delay periods which are to be ex-
cluded in computing the statutory time limits.
61d. § 3161(b). The thirty day time period also
commences when the defendant is "served with a
summons in connection with such charges." Id.
71d. § 3161(c).
1Id.
9 Some states have as well enacted statutes which
require that an accused be brought to trial within
definite time periods. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1382
(West 1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 103-05(a)
(1973); IOwA CODE ANN. §§ 795.1, 795.2 (Supp. 1976);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 277, § 72 (Supp. 1976); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 781 (Supp. 1976); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 10.37.020, 10.46.010 (Supp. 1976).
10 See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(0(g).
11 Id. During the first year, the time period be-
tween arrest and indictment was sixty days, between
indictment and arraignment ten days, and between
arraignment and trial 180 days. For the second year,
this time limit is forty-five days between arrest and
indictment, ten days between indictment and ar-
raignment, and 120 days between arraignment and
trial. During the third year, there is allotted thirty-
five days between arrest and indictment, ten days
between indictment and arraignment, and eighty
days between arraignment and trial. These transi-
tional time limits carry no sanctions for noncompli-
ance. Presumably, though, courts still retain their
authority to dismiss for unnecessary delay under Rule
48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See
Hansen & Reed, supra note 2, at 416.
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Examples are delays attributable to the unavail-
ability of the defendant or of an essential wit-
ness, 12 delays caused by other proceedings in-
volving the accused,13 and delays resulting from
the granting of a continuance when "the ends
ofjustice served by the granting of such contin-
uance outweigh the best interests of the public
and the defendant in a speedy trial.'
4
Third, section 3162(a)(1)(2) establishes sanc-
tions for noncompliance with the statutory time
limits. This provision, which will not become
effective until July 1, 1979,15 provides that if the
applicable time limits (excluding periods al-
lowed for justifiable delays) are not adhered to,
the charges against the defendant must be dis-
missed either with or without prejudice. Where
there is excessive delay between arrest and in-
dictment, the charges are to be dropped auto-
matically.' 6 If the delay occurs between arraign-
ment and trial, however, the defendant is ex-
pressly required to move for dismissal.1 7 Failure
to so move prior to trial or entry of a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere constitutes a waiver
of the right to dismissal." In determining
whether to dismiss a case either with or without
prejudice, the section requires that the court
shall consider, among others, the following fac-
tors: "the seriousness of the offense; the facts
and circumstances of the case which led to the
dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on
the administration of this chapter and on the
administration of justice."' 9
Law review commentators have severely criti-
cized section 3162(a)(1)(2) for failing to require
dismissal with prejudice, 20 observing that if the
charges are dismissed without prejudice, the
accused is subject to immediate rearrest and
reindictment. 2' Further, if a formal accusation
12 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(A).
13 Id. § 3161(h)(1).
14 Id. § 3161(h)(8)(A).
'5 18 U.S.C. § 3163(c).6 Id. § 3162(a)(1).
7 Id. § 3162(a)(2).
18Id.
" Id. § 3162(a)(1)(2). In addition, the Act grants
the court discretionary authority to impose fines and
suspensions upon attorneys who engage in deliberate
misconduct. See § 3162(b). For a more detailed analy-
sis of the provisions of the Act, see Steinberg, supra
note 2, at 232-35.
" See Hansen & Reed,supra note 2, at 415-17; Russ
& Mandelkern, supra note 2, at 1-2, 27-29.
" See Note, Federal System Adopts Specific Parameters
for the Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial- Speedy Trial
Act of 1974, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 449, 456 (1976).
is dismissed on the defendant's motion, the
Act's time periods commence anew and thus
fail to provide the prosecution with any incen-
tive to increase efficiency and attention to de-
layed cases.22 In addition, dismissal without
prejudice may inflict greater harm upon the
accused than a trial delay, since reindictment
could necessitate the hiring of new counsel and
the duplication of legal and investigative proce-
dures, all at severe monetary and psychological
harm to the accused.2 3 One commentator has
concluded that "by merely imposing uniform
time limits for the disposition of criminal cases
without providing an effective sanction, [Con-
gress] has made an empty shell out of the
Speedy Trial Act.
24
However meritorious these criticisms may be,
Congress nevertheless has spoken, and the cru-
cial issue is what questions should be considered
by the courts in determining whether a dis-
missal should be with or without prejudice.
This article shall attempt to confront this issue
by raising and proposing solutions to the fol-
lowing inquiries: (1) Is the district court's deter-
mination to dismiss with or without prejudice a
question of fact or law? (2) May the court dis-
miss with prejudice even though there has been
no speedy trial constitutional violation? (3) Are
the factors which the Act requires the court to
consider in determining whether to dismiss
with or without prejudice the sole relevant fac-
tors?
Before turning to these questions, it is appro-
priate to examine the purposes underlying the
Speedy Trial Act. As stated in the legislative
history, the Act was designed "to assist in re-
ducing crime and the danger of recidivism in
requiring speedy trials and by strengthening
the supervision over persons released pending
trial, and for other purposes .... 23 Congress's
approach reflects the view that the swift dispo-
sition of criminal charges plays an important
role in deterrence and rehabilitation.2 6 Some
commentators question the validity of this ap-
22 18 U.S.C. § 3161(d); Russ & Mandelkern, supra
note 2, at 12, 27.
13 Hansen & Reed, supra note 2, at 416; Russ &
Mandelkern, supra note 2, at 27-28.
24 Russ & Mandelkern, supra note 2, at 28.
' 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., at 7401.
26 Cf. Burger, The State of the Judiciay-1970, 56
A.B.AJ. 929, 932 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Burger]. More recently, The Chief Justice stated that
"[tihe swift disposition of criminal charges is a major
[Vol. 68
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proach, asserting that severe punishment sup-
presses undesirable behavior more effectively
than mere certainty of swift punishment.2 7 It is
apparent that society's purpose in bringing de-
fendants promptly to trial is effectively served
only by a high apprehension rate soon after the
commission of the alleged offense,2 9 while the
reality is that arrest may not occur until months
or even years after the crime. As a result, the
assertion that speedy trials serve as effective
deterrent and rehabilitative tools is a questiona-
ble one.
Other purposes promoted by the Act are less
debatable. One is to provide greater safeguards
for the individual defendant. 30 Excessive delay
before trial may not only cause an accused to
incur psychological harm, but may also directly
affect his ability to adequately prepare and de-
fend his case. 3' In addition, society has a retri-
bution interest in having punishment imposed
upon convicted defendants as speedily as prac-
ticable.
3 2
A proper construction of the sanctions provi-
sion is essential to obtain these objectives, since
prosecutorial authorities would otherwise have
little incentive to comply with the statutory time
limits. It is therefore imperative that courts
vigilantly construe this provision in order to
ensure that the Act's purposes are fulfilled.
II. DISMISSAL WITH OR WITHOUT PREJUDICE-
QUESTION OF FACT OR LAW?
If the trial court's decision to dismiss with or
without prejudice is a determination of fact, the
decision can be set aside by the appellate court
deterrent that has not had sufficient attention in the
administration ofjustice." Address by Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Burger, American Bar Association Mid-Winter
Meeting, Feb. 23, 1975.
27 See, e.g., Singer, Psychological Studies of Punish-
ment, 58 CAL. L. REV. 405, 417 (1970).
28 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., at 7409.
29 Singer, Psychological Studies of Punishment, 58
CAL. L. REV. at 417-18.
30 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., at 7402.
"' See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,532-33 (1972).
12 As noted by the dissenters in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972), "There is no authority suggesting
that the Eighth Amendment was intended to purge
the law of its retributive elements, and the Court has
consistently assumed that retribution is a legitimate
dimension of the punishment of crimes." Id. at 394
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
only if it is clearly erroneous3 and not merely
because the appellate court might have reached
a different result.3 4 A finding is deemed clearly
erroneous when, although there exists evidence
to support it, "the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm con-
viction that a mistake has been committed .
''
3
No such deference, however, is accorded to the
district court when a question of law is involved.
In this situation, the appellate court is not
bound to any extent by the lower court's judg-
ment but is free to draw its own conclusions.
3 6
. In determining whether a dismissal should be
with or without prejudice under the Speedy
Trial Act, the court must consider, among oth-
ers, the following four factors: (1) the serious-
ness of the offense, (2) the facts and circum-
stances which led to the dismissal, (3) the impact
of a reprosecution on the administration of the
Act, and (4) the impact of a reprosecution on
the administration of justice.37 Does the trial
court's assessment of each of these factors in-
volve a question of fact or law? Beginning the
analysis with factors (3) and (4), it is clear that
both of these variables should be labeled as
questions of law. The lower court's function in
' See Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 493
(1963); United States v. Connor, 478 F.2d 1320, 1323
(7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723,
728 (5th Cir. 1973); 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2573, at 689 (1971 ed.). As
Professors Wright and Miller have observed, the
clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure has been approvingly
applied to factual findings of a trial judge in criminal
matters. In pertinent part, Rule 52(a) provides that
findings of fact in cases tried without ajury "shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge of the credibility of the witnesses ......
34 See United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
394-95 (1948).
3 Id. at 395. Or, as stated byJudge Learned Hand.
It is idle to try to define the meaning of the
phrase 'clearly erroneous'; all that can be profit-
ably said is that an appellate court, though it will
hesitate less to reverse the finding of a judge
than that of an administrative tribunal or of a
jury, will nevertheless reverse it most reluctantly
and only when well persuaded. United States v.
Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945).
36 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 5A 52.03[2], at 2662-
63 (2d. ed. 5). See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d. 149 (9th Cir. 1963):
"'[W]e are in as good a position as the trial judge to
determine [the ultimate question]."' Id. at 152, quot-
ing, Miles Shoes, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 199 F.2d
602, 602-03 (2d Cir. 1952).
37 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1)(2).
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this assessment is not to resolve disputed facts
orjudge the credibility of witnesses, but to draw
conclusions about the potential impact a repro-
secution of the accused would have. As phrased
by one court, "When a finding is essentially one
dealing with the effect of certain transactions or
events, rather than a finding which resolves
disputed facts, an appellate court is not bound
by the rule that findings shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, but is free to draw its
own conclusions."38 Thus, with regard to fac-
tors (3) and (4) a question of law, rather than
fact, is presented.
Turning next to factor (1), the seriousness of
the offense, any doubts as to whether this con-
sideration is a question of fact or law may be
resolved by answering the following inquiry: In
determining the seriousness of the offense with
which the defendant is charged, does the ap-
pellate court have before it the same informa-
tion, having the same reliability, as the district
court had? In his analysis, the trial judge nei-
ther resolves conflicting facts nor assesses the
credibility of witnesses. Rather, he examines
the charges pending against the accused, and
then arrives at his determination. Similarly, the
reviewing court scrutinizes the offenses
charged and then makes an assessment regard-
ing their seriousness. Clearly, the reviewing
court is in as good a position as the trial court to
assess the seriousness of the offense, and the
lower court's determination is therefore a mat-
ter of law.
The last variable to be considered is factor
(2): the facts and circumstances which led to the
dismissal. In determining the facts and circum-
38 United States v. Hart, No. 76-1196 (9th Cir.
Oct. 28, 1976) (en banc) (Hufstedler, J., concurring
and dissenting) (emphasis added), quoting, Stevenot
v. Norberg, 210 F.2d 615, 619 (9th Cir. 1954). That
statement was also quoted with approval by the Ninth
Circuit in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 152 n.2 (9th Cir. 1963).
Judge Hufstedler recognized that her supporting au-
thorities were civil rather than criminal decisions.
With respect to this issue, she observed:
These are civil cases, but no reason exists to
apply a more restrictive standard of appellate
review to criminal cases. On the contrary, a re-
spectable argument can be made that deeper,
rather than shallower, appellate scrutiny should
be given to criminal cases because the societal
and personal stakes in criminal cases are often
larger than in civil cases.
No. 76-1196 n.1 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and
dissenting).
stances which require that he dismiss with or
without prejudice, the trial judge must resolve
disputed facts and judge the credibility of wit-
nesses. For instance, the prosecution may claim
that the excessive delay was caused by case ov-
erload, while the accused may argue that the
prosecution's conduct was grossly negligent.
The resolution of this question is one of fact,
reversible on appeal only if clearly erroneous:
"A finding of fact to which the clearly erro-
neous rule applies, is a finding based on the
'fact-finding tribunal's experience with the
mainsprings of human conduct.' 39 A totally
different question is raised, however, when one
inquires as to what inference should reasonably
be drawn from the findings of fact by the dis-
trict court. Utilizing the prior example, the trial
court's finding that the government was grossly
negligent in not complying with the Act's time
periods is a finding of fact. But the effect or
impact of this noncompliance is a question of
law. Thus, the determination whether the gov-
ernment's grossly negligent behavior warrants
dismissal with prejudice involves a legal ques-
tion. At this point, there is no dispute as to facts
or the credibility of witnesses, but there is an
issue as to what effect should be given to the
prosecution's negligent conduct. The determi-
nation of this issue is a finding of law. The
existence of factual elements, specifically in fac-
tor (2), does not transmute this legal question
into a factual one. Rather, the crucial inquiries
are whether the appellate court is situated in as
good a position as the lower court to resolve the
issues raised and whether the trial court's find-
ings concern the effect or impact of certain
events rather than disputed facts and witness
credibility. Since both of these questions must
be answered in the affirmative, the appellate
court is "free from the restraining influence of
the 'clearly erroneous' rule," and may therefore
draw its own conclusions.
40
'9 United States v. Hart, No. 76-1196 (9th Cir.
Oct. 28, 1976) (en banc), quoting, Lundgren v. Free-
man, 307 F.2d 104, 115 (9th Cir. 1962), quoting, Com-
missioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960).
The issue before the Ninth Circuit in Hart was
whether the district judge's determination that the
government utilized reasonable efforts to secure the
informant's presence at the defendant's trial was a
question of fact or law.
'0 Kiwi Coders Corp. v. Acro Tool & Die Works,
250 F.2d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 1957). It should be noted
that the Act itself does not provide for an interlocu-
[Vol. 68
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III. DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE- WHETHER
THERE MUST BE A CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATION
The sixth amendment provides that: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial .... .4. In
Klopfer v. North Carolina,42 the Supreme Court
deemed this right as fundamental, enforceable
against the states by application of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
43
and in Strunk v. United States,44 the Court held
that the sole remedy for a deprivation of the
right is dismissal with prejudice.43 Then in Bar-
ker v. Wingo,4" the Court promulgated a four
step test to determine whether a constitutional
violation of the right to a speedy trial had taken
place. The four factors which courts must as-
sess in this determination are: "Length of delay,
the reason for the delay, the defendant's asser-
tion of his right, and prejudice to the defend-
ant.147 The Court stressed that no one factor
tory appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss
under Section 3162 or from an order authorizing
dismissal without prejudice. It is arguable that since
the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment or a
dismissal without prejudice may not be viewed as an
appealable order, the defendant must stand trial and
raise this issue on appeal after he is convicted.
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541 (1949), should be persuasive that the denial
of a motion to dismiss or an order dismissing without
prejudice should be appealable, because if appellate
review is delayed until final disposition, the asserted
right will be irreparably lost. Employing Cohen on an
analogous question, appellate courts have ruled that
an order denying a motion to dismiss on grounds of
double jeopardy is an appealable interlocutory order.
See United States v. Disilvio, 520 F.2d 247 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975); United States
v. Beckerman, 516 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1972). The
same rationale should apply here. Alternatively, re-
lief by writ of mandamus or prohibition could be
sought. See Hilbert v. Dooling, 476 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973), where this
remedy was utilized. For additional discussion on this
subject, see Russ & Mandelkern, supra, note 2, at 28-
29.
41 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
42 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
43 Id.; Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 374-75 (1969).
44 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
4- Id. at 437-40. For articles which discuss the sixth
amendment right at greater length, see Amsterdam,
Speedy Criminal Tial. Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 525, 539-41 (1975); Godbold, Speedy Trial-Ma-
jor Surgery for a National Ill, 24 ALA. L. REv. 265, 274-
88 (1972); Steinberg at 230-32.
46 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
47 Id. at 530.
alone is adequate for finding a speedy trial
abridgement. Rather, all four factors are inter-
related and must be examined together.'
With regard to the length of permissible de-
lay, the Court held that there exists "no constitu-
tional basis for holding that the speedy trial
right can be quantified into a specified number
of days or months."49 Concerning possible rea-
sons for the delay, the Court concluded that
deliberate delays in an effort to hinder the de-
fendant's case must be weighed heavily against
the government; that negligence or over-
crowded dockets must be weighed, but less
heavily than intentional delays; and that ajusti-
fiable excuse, such as a missing essential wit-
ness, is not to be counted against the govern-
ment.50 With respect to the defendant's failure
to demand a speedy trial, the Court held that
although the fundamental guarantee cannot be
presumptively waived 5 ' "failure to assert the
right will make it difficult for a defendant to
prove that he was denied a speedy trial. '5 2 Re-
garding the factor of prejudice, the Court con-
cluded that if material witnesses become una-
vailable during the unwarranted delay, or can-
not accurately recollect events which are at is-
sue, the prejudice is clear. Prejudice also occurs
when the accused has been subjected to pro-
longed pre-trial incarceration, and even if he is
not incarcerated prior to trial, he nevertheless
suffers severe anxiety by having restraints im-
posed upon his freedom and being subjected to
public suspicion .33
Another principle of constitutional right was
48 Id. at 533.
41 Id. at 523 (emphasis added). Thus, whether the
length of delay is prejudicial to the accused's sixth
amendment guarantee must be determined by the
facts and circumstances of each case. Id. at 530-31.
so Id. at 531; see Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S.
434,436 (1973); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,
325 (1971); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361
(1957).
51 407 U.S. at 525. The demand-waiver rule, fol-
lowed in some jurisdictions, stated that the accused
waived the right for all periods prior to which he
failed to demand a speedy trial. The Barker Court
rejected this doctrine on the basis that to presume
waiver of a fundamental right through inaction was
contrary to the principle of waiver of fundamental
constitutional guarantees. For a commentary criticiz-
ing the demand-waiver rule, see ABA STANDARDS
RELATING To SPEEDY TRIAL § 2.2, at 17, Comment at
18 (Approved Draft 1970).




enunciated in United States v. Marion, 4 where
the Supreme Court held that the Speedy Trial
Clause only takes effect when the defendant
has been subjected to a formal indictment,
information or upon arrest.55 Thus, the speedy
trial right provides no protection against prose-
cutorial misconduct during the pre-arrest or
pre-indictment stage.,6
One of the significant questions that will con-
front the courts when the sanctions provision of
the Act becomes effective is whether dismissal
with prejudice can occur only when there has
been a sixth amendment violation.5 7 In cases
recently decided, the government has argued
that dismissal with prejudice under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) is warranted
only if there has been a constitutional depriva-
54 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
55 Id. at 320. Concurring in the result, Mr. Justice
Douglas, joined by Mr. Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, argued that the Speedy Trial Clause should
extend as well to pre-indictment delay: the obligation
which the sixth amendment "places on Government
officials to proceed expeditiously with criminal prose-
cutions would have little meaning if those officials
could determine when that duty was to commence."
Id. at 331-32 (Douglas, J., concurring in the result).
For an analysis, see two works by the author pro-
posing that, in the absence of good cause for delay,
the time period should begin to run when the prose-
cutor has probable cause to prosecute. Steinberg,
supra note 2, at 239; Comment, Right to Speedy Trial:
Maintaining a Proper Balance Between the Interests of
Society and the Rights of the Accused, 4 UCLA-ALASKA L.
REv. 242, 259-60 (1974).
11 Writing for the Marion Court, Mr. Justice White
asserted that the remedy for prosecutorial miscon-
duct at this time is the due process clause of the fifth
amendment:
[T]he statute of limitations does not fully define
the appellees' rights with respect to the events
occurring prior to indictment. Thus, the Gov-
ernment concedes that the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment would require dis-
missal of the indictment if it were shown at trial
that the pre-indictment delay in this case caused
substantial prejudice to appellees' rights to a fair
trial and that the delay was an intentional device
to gain tactical advantage over the accused.
404 U.S. at 324. Even under this formulation, how-
ever, the defendant has no protection against negli-
gent delay by the government during the pre-indict-
ment period.
5, The author has considered this question in an-
other work, concluding that: "When dismissal is with
prejudice . . . the Act provides that the court exam-
ine the same type of factors which are constitutionally
mandated in Barker lv. Wingo]." Steinberg, supra note
2, at 235. Upon reexamination, the author believes
that the above assertion is incorrect, for reasons
which are stated in the following discussion.
tion.55 The same rationale could be extended to
encompass dismissal with prejudice under the
Speedy Trial Act.
However, in authorizing dismissal with prej-
udice under the Act, it appears that Congress
intended that such a dismissal may be declared
by the court in the absence of a constitutional
violation. Support for this contention is to be
found in the Act's legislative history. When the
Act passed the Senate, it mandated dismissal
with prejudice for noncompliance with the sta-
tutory time limits but permitted reprosecution
if the court determined that the delay was
caused "by exceptional circumstances which the
Government and the Court could not have fo-
reseen or avoided." 9 The House version of the
Act, approved by the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, provided for an even harsher remedy:
noncompliance would require dismissal with
prejudice, and reprosecution was absolutely
barred." Understandably, the Justice Depart-
ment vehemently opposed both the Senate and
House versions. In a letter to Congressman
Rodino, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee,
Attorney General Saxbe complained:
Mandatory dismissal of criminal cases not tried
within 60 days can only serve to injure the public
by releasing persons charged with crime [sic]
without an adjudication. This injures the public
not only because the person may pose a danger
to the public welfare, but also because it under-
mines the public's confidence in the criminal jus-
tice system to see persons charged with crimes
released without trial.
61
58 See United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 832-
36 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Correia, 531 F.2d
1095, 1097-98 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Garner,
529 F.2d 962, 968 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Clendening, 526 F.2d 842, 844 n.2 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Stoker, 522 F.2d 576, 580 (10th Cir.
1975); United States v. Clay, 481 F.2d 133, 135 (7th
Cir. 1973); Almeda v. Blaubaum, 400 F. Supp. 177,
184 (D. Ariz. 1975); United States v. Crow Dog, 399 F.
Supp. 228, 239 (D. Iowa 1975).
59 S. 754, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101, ch. 208, §
3162(b)(1974).
I H.R. REP. No. 93-1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at
37 (1974).
6, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., at 7447. A similar view was expressed by the
minority in the House Report:
If the purpose of the speedy trial act is to protect
society as a whole by enabling the courts to
promptly dispose of criminal defendants, then
we fear that this bill will frustrate that end by
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This strong opposition by the Justice Depart-
ment prevented the Act from obtaining final
passage. Finally, in order to secure the neces-
sary votes for approval, an amendment was
introduced which stated that dismissal could be
either with or without prejudice at the court's
discretion.62 On the last day of the 93rd Con-
gress, with the amended language substituted
for the sanctions which earlier had been pro-
vided, the Senate and House passed the Act.u
This histoy implies that in finally accepting a
compromise solution permitting dismissal with
or without prejudice at the court's discretion,
Congress manifested its intent that dismissal
barring reprosecution be authorized even
where constitutional rights had not been
abridged. This assertion already has been ad-
vanced by the Ninth Circuit. Referring to the
Speedy Trial Act in dictum, that appellate court
concluded that the sanctions provision "clearly
provides that a dismissal with prejudice may
occur even though there has been no constitu-
tional violation."'
'h
An analogy can be drawn between the sanc-
tions provision of the Act and Rule 48(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In perti-
nent part, that rule provides: "[I~f there is un-
necessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial,
the court may dismiss the indictment, informa-
tion, or complaint." As the government has
recognized, the rule provides the court with
inherent authority, derived from common law,
to dismiss a prosecution independent of consti-
tutional considerations. 65 The government has
argued, however, that unless there has been a
constitutional deprivation, dismissal must be
without prejudice. 6  Early cases supported this
allowing defendants to be set free. We can imag-
ine no greater defect in the bill than the release
of defendants without full determination of
their guilt or innocence. ...
Id. at 7455.
62 120 CONG. REC. 12,570 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1974)
(remarks of Congressman Cohen).
I Id. at 12,573, 22,489. For additional material on
the legislative history, see Hansen & Reed,supra note
2, at 415; Russ & Mandelkern, supra note 2, at 25-26.
64 United States v. Graham, 538 F.2d 261, 266 (9th
Cir. 1976), quoting, United States v. Simmons, 536
F.2d 827, 836 (9th Cir. 1976).
6 See United States v. Correia, 531 F.2d 1095, 1098
(1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Stoker, 522 F.2d 576,
580 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Furey, 514 F.2d
1098, 1102-03 (2d Cir. 1975).
66 See United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 832
(9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Clendening, 526 F.2d
contention.6 7 More recent holdings, however,
authorize dismissal barring reprosecution with-
out requiring a sixth amendment violation.68 A
leading case on this question is the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in United States v. Furey.69 In up-
holding the dismissal with prejudice provision
contained in Rule 4 of the Eastern District of
New York and Second Circuit Plans for the
Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, 0
842, 843 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Furey, 514
F.2d 1098, 1103 (2d Cir. 1975).
67 See Cohen v. United States, 366 F.2d 363, 367
(9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1035 (1967);
United States v. Apex Distributing Co., 270 F.2d 747,
750 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Mark II Electron-
ics of Louisiana, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 280, 284 (E.D. La.
1968). A discussion of these cases appears in United
States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d at 832-33, 833 nn.24 &25,
and United States v. Furey, 514 F.2d at 1103-04.
68 See United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d at 836;
United States v. Stoker, 522 F.2d at 580; United States
v. Furey, 514 F.2d at 1104.
69 514 F.2d 1098 (2d Cir. 1975).
70 Rule 4 provides:
In all cases the government must be ready for
trial within six months from the date of the
arrest, service of summons, detention, or the
filing of a complaint or of a formal charge upon
which the defendant is to be tried, whichever is
earliest. If the government is not ready for trial
within such time, and if the defendant is
charged only with non-capital offenses, the de-
fendant may move in writing, on at least ten
days' notice to the government, for dismissal of
the indictment. Any such motion shall be de-
cided with utmost promptness. If it should ap-
pear that sufficient grounds existed for tolling
any portion of the six-months period under one
or more of the exceptions in Rule 5 [Rule 5 tolls
the six-month period in various circumstances],
the motion shall be denied, whether or not the
government has previously requested a continu-
ance. Otherwise the court shall enter an order
dismissing the indictment with prejudice unless
the court finds that the government's neglect is
excusable, in which event the dismissal shall not
be effective if the government is ready to pro-
ceed to trial within ten days.
Writing for an en banc panel of the Second Circuit,
Judge Mansfield observed:
The purpose of Rule 4 is to insure that regard-
less whether a defendant has been prejudiced in
a given case or his constitutional rights have
been infringed, the trial of the charge against
him will go forward promptly instead of being
frustrated by creeping, paralytic procedural de-
lays of the type that have spawned a backlog of
thousands of cases, with the public losing confi-
dence in the courts and gaining the impression
that federal criminal laws cannot be enforced.
Hilbert v. Dooling, 476 F.2d 355, 357-58 (2d Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973). For a discus-
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adopted pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 7' the Furey court
reaffirmed its decision rendered two years ear-
lier in Hilbert v. Dooling72 that "it is within the
court's inherent power to dismiss a prosecution
with prejudice for prosecutorial delay not rising
to constitutional dimensions .... -,7 Perhaps
the most thorough analysis rendered on this
subject is the Ninth Circuit's recent opinion in
United States v. Simmons,74 which held that dis-
missal with prejudice, not arising from a sixth
amendment abridgment, is permissible provid-
ing that this sanction is exercised with caution
after prosecutors have been forewarned of the
consequences.7 '5 In reaching this conclusion,
the Ninth Circuit found the Speedy Trial Act to
be highly relevant. The court stated:
Although the time limits imposed by the Speedy
Trial Act of 1974 were not applicable to this
proceeding, we believe that the Act is relevant to
show that dismissal with prejudice not arising
from a constitutional violation should be exer-
cised with caution and only after a forewarning
of the consequences.... Thus, the Speedy Trial
Act clearly provides that a dismissal with preju-
dice may occur even though there has been no
constitutional violation. But in so providing, the
Act requires that courts exercise caution in utiliz-
ing this procedure. Such caution is manifested by
the consideration of various factors enumerated
by the Act, plus other relevant factors which
courts may independently employ in reaching
the ultimate decision. More importantly, the Act
clearly forewarns the United States Attorney that
sion comparing the provisions of the Second Circuit
Plan with the Speedy Trial Act, see Comment, Speedy
Trials: Recent Developments Concerning a Vital Right, 4
FORD. URB. L.J. 351 (1976).
71 In pertinent part, Rule 50(b) states:
To minimize undue delay and to further the
prompt disposition of criminal cases, each dis-
trict court shall conduct a continuing study of
the administration of criminal justice in the dis-
trict court and before United States magistrates
of the district and shall prepare a plan for the
prompt disposition of criminal cases which shall
include rules relating to time limits within which
procedures prior to trial, the trial itself, and
sentencing must take place, means of reporting
the status of cases, and such other matters as are
necessary or proper to minimize delay and facili-
tate the prompt disposition of such cases....
FED. R. CRIM. P. 50(b).
72 476 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 878 (1973).
73 514 F.2d at 1104; see 476 F.2d at 358-61.
74 536 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1976).
75 Id. at 836.
he must comply with the applicable time limits or
face the possibility that the indictment or infor-
mation will be dismissed with prejudice."
IV. FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE
COURT'S DETERMINATION WHETHER TO DIS-
MISS WITH OR WITHOUT PREJUDICE
In determining whether to dismiss with or
without prejudice, section 3162(a)(1)(2) requires
that the court consider, among others, the fol-
lowing factors: "the seriousness of the offense;
the facts and circumstances which led to the
dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on
the administration of this chapter and on the
administration of justice." In enumerating
these factors, Congress declined to assess
greater significance to one factor over another.
It thus appears that Congress promulgated a
balancing test in which all relevant factors are to
be considered together.
Implementation of this approach requires a
case by case determination, and the delicate
balancing process involved frequently results in
a subjective determination by the court.7 7 Some
general principles may be advanced, however,
which may lend guidance to courts making this
decision. In formulating these principles, the
purposes underlying the Act must be given pri-
mary attention. As stated earlier in this article,
the Act was designed to protect both the de-
fendant's and society's interests. By providing
for a maximum of 100 days between arrest and
trial, the Act spares the accused much of the
anxiety and prejudice which he otherwise
would have incurred. This time period pro-
vides greater assurance to society that the ac-
cused will not commit additional crimes while
he is awaiting trial, better promotes the retribu-
tive purpose of the criminal law, arguably de-
ters the accused and other members of society
from engaging in illegal conduct, and also ar-
guably eases the rehabilitation process.78 Keep-
ing these purposes in mind, the following dis-
cussion will consider the relevancy to the court's
determination whether to dismiss with or with-
out prejudice of each of the four factors men-
76 Id. at 835-36. For articles which discuss the rela-
tionship between the sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial and the Speedy Trial Act, see Hansen &
Reed, supra note 2; Steinberg; Note, The Speedy Trial
Act of 1974: Defining the Sixth Amendment Right, 25
CATH. U. L. REV. 130 (1975).
7' The adoption of the balancing test by the Court
in Barker entails the same problems.
78 See text & accompanying notes 25-33 supra.
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tioned in section 3162(a)(1)(2). Afterwards,
other relevant factors will be discussed. Finally,
this section will inquire into those factors which
should not enter into the court's determination.
A. Seriousness of the Offense
If the Speedy Trial Act was enacted for the
sole reason of providing greater safeguards for
the accused, the seriousness of the offense
charged would be wholly irrelevant. But since a
major purpose of the Act is better to protect
society's interests, this factor becomes highly
material. The more serious the offense with
which the accused is charged, the greater inter-
est society has in permitting the government to
reprosecute. The problem is to determine what
makes an offense of the serious variety. It is
certainly plausible to classify any crime as seri-
ous which involves the threat or use of violence
(e.g., armed robbery). But non-violent crimes,
particularly those which have massive social im-
plications, also may be considered serious in
nature. For example, it is arguable that indict-
ing a corporate executive for criminally pollut-
ing public waters involves an offense which is as
reprehensible as many violent offenses. The
seriousness of the offense cannot be defined by
the range of sentences imposed by the legisla-
ture, because inconsistency on the legislature's
part between length of the sentence and sever-
ity of the crime has been aptly demonstrated.
7 9
Thus, the determination of the seriousness of
the offense charged against the accused cannot
79 See, e.g., In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410,505 P.2d 921,
105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972), where the California Su-
preme Court held that an indeterminate sentence
ranging from one year to life for the defendant's
second conviction of indecent exposure violated the
California constitutional prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. In so ruling, the court
compared this sentence to others provided by the
legislature for far more serious crimes:
[I]s it rational to believe that second-offense in-
decent exposure is a more dangerous crime than
the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice but in the heat of passion? Yet the pun-
ishment for manslaughter is far less .... The
same is true for such other violent crimes against
the person as assault with intent to commit mur-
der, kidnapping, mayhem, assault with intent to
commit mayhem or robbery, assault with caustic
chemicals with intent to injure or disfigure, and
assault on a peace officer or fireman engaged in
the performance of his duties.
8 Cal. 3d at 431, 503 P.2d at 935, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 231,
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
be fixed solely by objective standards, but must
necessarily involve a partly subjective analysis.
In making this determination, however, courts
must remember that this factor is one of at least
four which must be scrutinized and interre-
lated.
B. Facts and Circumstances Which Led to the
Dismissal
The principle underlying this factor is that
there exists an affirmative duty upon courts
and prosecutors to comply with the statutory
time limits. When this obligation has not been
met, dismissal is required even though the ex-
cessive delay may have been due to court
congestion or prosecutorial work overload.80 In
determining whether to dismiss with or without
prejudice, however, the court must consider
whether dismissal barring reprosecution would
provide an incentive for the courts and prose-
cutors to adhere to these time limits in the
future. When noncompliance is caused by cir-
cumstances beyond the control of either the
court or prosecutor, no such incentive would be
provided by dismissing with prejudice. For ex-
ample, in enacting the Act, Congress declined
to create any new judgeships to enable the
courts to operate more efficiently under their
already overburdened workload."' Authorizing
dismissal barring reprosecution under such
court congestion, when the judiciary is attempt-
ing in good faith to comply with the time limits,
would normally serve no useful purpose.
An entirely different situation appears, how-
ever, when the impermissible delay occurs be-
cause of the court's or prosecutor's deliberate
or negligent misconduct. Permitting reprosecu-
tion under these circumstances would render
the Act without an effective remedy. Prosecuto-
rial authorities, realizing that they could engage
in misconduct and yet have another opportu-
80 See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C).
8 Congress' failure to supply additional federal
judges has been criticized by the Chief Justice. In
reminding Congress that the Act was passed over the
unamimous dissent of the United States Judicial Con-
ference, he stated: "I agree that even the internal
working rules of courts should not be left exclusively
to judges, but at least there should be the closest kind
of cooperation between the legislative and judicial
branches and respect for the views of experienced
judges who must make the law work." Address by Mr.
Chief Justice Burger, American Law Institute Con-
ference, May 18, 1976.
1977]
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nity to try the accused, would have little incen-
tive to comply with the Act's time limits.
12
C. The Impact of a Reprosecution on the
Administration of the Act and on the Administration
of Justice
The third and fourth factors that the court
must consider under the sanctions provision is
the impact that dismissal with or without preju-
dice would have on the administration of the
Act and on the administration of justice. Al-
though these factors are relevant, Congress
failed to provide any insight into what it meant
by the phraseology, "administration of the
Act '" 3 and "administration of justice.8 4 Thus,
the consideration of these two factors involves a
balancing test. On the one side, there is society's
interest in making all potentially guilty de-
fendants stand trial. On the other side, the
defendant has a strong interest in not being
reprosecuted, and society has an interest, when
the delay is caused by judicial or prosecutorial
misconduct, to deter such misbehavior in the
future. Query what considerations should be
relevant to the court in this balancing decision.
First, the court should assess the degree of
prejudice which reprosecution would impose
upon the accused. Second, the facts and cir-
cumstances which led to the dismissal should be
scrutinized. Third, the court should examine
the seriousness of the offenses pending and the
severity of the defendant's past criminal record.
Thus, it appears that these two factors merely
82 Further, this concept encompasses both deliber-
ate and negligent misconduct. As stated recently by
the Ninth Circuit in dictum, "With the implementa-
tion of the Speedy Trial Act's time periods in the
fairly near future, the government should be aware
that negligent conduct in bringing an accused to trial
will not be tolerated." United States v. Graham, 538
F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1976).
83 This concept may signify that the court should
consider the impact that dismissal permitting or bar-
ring reprosecution would have upon the efficient
operation of the Act. Or the term may mean that the
court should consider whether dismissal with or with-
out prejudice would further or retard the achieve-
ment of the purposes advanced by the Act. Upon
reflection, both of these interpretations merge into
one definitional concept. This result occurs because
the Act can only be efficient if it fulfills the purposes
for which it was enacted.
84 The objective of administering justice in decid-
ing a given case enjoys a high stature within the
American legal system. The difficult question is the
assessment of what is just in any specific situation. See
R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION, 84-85
(1961).
restate the other factors which enter into the
court's determination whether to dismiss with
or without prejudice.
D. Other Factors That Should Be Considered
This subsection of the article will discuss
three additional factors which courts should
consider in determining whether to dismiss
with or without prejudice. These factors are the
defendant's prior criminal record, the preju-
dice inflicted upon the accused by subjecting
him to possible reprosecution, and the effect
that dismissal with or without prejudice has on
prosecutorial incentive to comply With the sta-
tutory time periods.
1. Defendant's Prior Criminal Record
The Act recognizes that the defendant while
he is awaiting trial may present a danger to the
community in which he lives. Commenting on
the fact that approximately three-quarters of all
defendants are released pending trial, the
House Judiciary Committee noted: "This
means that persons who are likely to commit
additional crimes could without adequate su-
pervision and assistance continue to reap the
profits of criminal activity at the expense of the
public.185 In order to render better protection
against the occurrence of this hazard, Congress
enacted legislation which required defendants
to be tried within 100 days after arrest and
established pre-trial service agencies."
This legislative history indicates that Con-
gress was concerned with devising policies
which aid in promoting the general prevention
of crime. It is evident that a substantial percent-
age of crimes are committed by prior offend-
ers.8" Society's primary concern regarding these
recidivists is to isolate them from the commu-
nity in order to ensure that they will not commit
additional offenses. In determining Whether to
dismiss with or without prejudice under the
sanctions provision of the Act, courts should
recognize that a defendant with a past criminal
conviction record is more likely to commit addi-
tional crimes upon his return to the community
than is the arrestee who, if convicted, would be
a first-time offender. Although not indicative
85 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., at 7409.
86 For the sections relating to pre-trial service agen-
cies, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-55.
",See 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., at 7409.
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of the defendant's guilt on the pending
charges, his prior criminal record is relevant
with respect to society's concern in not releasing
that individual outright without requiring him
to stand trial.
88
The next inquiry is what portions of a de-
fendant's criminal record should be considered
by the court. First, only convictions, not mere
arrests or acquittals, should be material. Sub-
jecting an accused to harsher treatment when
the state failed to prove its case is contrary to
fundamental principles of justice. Second, all
convictions for the commission of serious of-
fenses should be considered relevant, 9 and
particularly, any convictions for similar types of
offenses. Third, the more severe the prior
crimes, the less recent the convictions need be.
To place a number of years in this assessment
necessarily involves an arbitrary determination.
Under most circumstances, as is the case under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, convictions for
non-homicide offenses should be relevant for a
period not exceeding ten years. 90
" See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), where
Chief Justice Warren stated:
Recidivist statutes have never been thought to
allow the State to show probability of guilt be-
cause of prior convictions. Their justification is
only that a defendant's prior crimes should lead
to enhanced punishment for any subsequent of-
fenses. Recidivist statutes embody four tradi-
tional rationales for imposing penal sanctions. A
man's prior crimes are thought to aggravate his
guilt for subsequent crimes, and thus greater
than usual retribution is warranted. Similarly,
the policies of insulating society from persons
whose past conduct indicates their propensity to
criminal behavior, of providing deterrence from
future crime, and of rehabilitating criminals are
all theoretically served by enhanced punishment
according to recidivist statutes. None of these
four traditional justifications for recidivist stat-
utes is related in any way to the burden of proof
to which the State is put to prove that a crime has
currently been committed by the alleged recidiv-
ist. rhe fact of prior convictions is not intended
by recidivist statutes to make it any easier for the
State to prove the commission of a subsequent
crime. The State does not argue in these cases
that its statutes are, or constitutionally could be,
intended to allow the prosecutor to introduce
prior convictions to show the accused's criminal
disposition....
Id. at 571 (Warren, CJ., concurring and dissenting).
" For a discussion of what offenses should be con-
sidered of a serious nature, see text & accompanying
note 79 supra.
" Rule 609(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence
provides for the admissibility of certain offenses for
2. Prejudice Suffered by the Accused
Under the sanctions provision, courts should
consider the extent of prejudice inflicted upon
the accused. In many cases, permitting the state
to reprosecute inflicts greater harm than does
the granting of a continuance. Reindictment
could require the employment of new counsel
and the further depletion of the defendant's
financial resources.91 By dismissing without
prejudice, the court subjects the defendant to
the whims of the prosecutor, who thereby gains
the privilege to reprosecute at any time within
the applicable statute of limitations. Further,
allowing reprosecution enables the state to
build its case while the defendant loses his. The
government, having the resources to engage in
additional investigational work, can devote its
efforts toward strengthening its case, and when
it believes that a conviction will be obtained, can
then reindict. The defendant, perhaps una-
ware that the state is pursuing his case and
unlikely in any event to have sufficient financial
resources, may no longer be able to prepare an
adequate defense. Thus, reprosecution subjects
the accused to substantial prejudice, a result
which should be a significant factor in the
court's decision whether to dismiss with or with-
out prejudice.
3. Prosecutorial Incentive to Comply with the Act's
Time Limits
This consideration, discussed earlier, is men-
tioned here again to emphasize that unless the
prosecution is provided with an incentive to
comply with the statutory time limits, the Act
will be without an effective remedy and thus
the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the wit-
ness. That rule states:
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not
admissible if a period of more than ten years has
elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the
release of the witness from the confinement im-
posed for that conviction, whichever is the later
date, unless the court determines, in the inter-
ests of justice, that the probative value of the
conviction supported by specific facts and cir-
cumstances substantially outweighs its prejudi-
cial effect. However, evidence of a conviction
more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is
not admissible unless the proponent gives to the
adverse party sufficient advance written notice
of intent to use such evidence to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest
the use of such evidence.
" Hansen & Reed, supra note 2, at 416; Russ &
Mandelkern, supra note 2, at 27-28.
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rendered a dead letter. The argument may be
phrased as follows: When the court dismisses
without prejudice, the state must once again
reindict the accused and redo some of the ac-
companying motions. This repetitive proce-
dure, however, is a small cost for the govern-
ment to incur for its noncompliance. It in no
way deters prosecutorial authorities from vio-
lating the Act's time periods. On the other
hand, dismissal barring reprosecution provides
these officials with a strong incentive to comply.
Since noncompliance might very well result in
the outright release of the defendant and for-
ever prevent the state from bringing him to
trial on the pending charges, prosecutors have
a strong interest in exercising every diligent
effort to adhere to the time periods. Thus,
although society's interests may suffer in the
short run by releasing potentially guilty de-
fendants without trial, from the long-range
perspective, dismissal barring reprosecution at
times is necessary if the Act is to achieve its
avowed purposes. 2
E. Factors That Should Not Be Considered
Three factors which should not enter into the
court's determination whether to dismiss with
or without prejudice are the defendant's asser-
tion of his statutory right to a speedy trial, the
likelihood of inducing a guilty plea by dismiss-
ing without prejudice, and the ability of the
prosecution to try the accused shortly after the
termination of the statutory time periods.
1. Defendant's Assertion of His Statutory Right
Under a sixth amendment analysis, the de-
fendant's assertion of his constitutional right is
an important consideration in determining
whether this guarantee has been abridged.
9 3
Under the Act, however, his demand for a
speedy trial is irrelevant. The time periods au-
tomatically commence once he has been ar-
rested or served with a summons.9 4 There is
92 Because the government incurs only slight in-
convenience by having to reprosecute the defendant,
it would seem logical that the court also would have
the discretion to grant a nolle prosequi with leave.
Perhaps this alternative was rejected because such
action directly affects the accused's constitutional
speedy trial guarantee. See Klopfer v. North Caro-
lina, 386 U.S. 213, 214-23 (1967).
a See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,531-32 (1972).
18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) provides in relevant part:
Any information or indictment charging an in-
one exception to this general rule; namely, that
the defendant waives his statutory right to a
speedy trial by failing to move for dismissal
before trial or entry of a guilty plea or a plea of
nolo contendere.5 3
Why Congress inserted this one exception
into the Act is difficult to comprehend. It may
be true that by declining to assert his right the
defendant is expressing his desire to proceed to
trial rather than face the possibility that his case
may be dismissed without prejudice. But most
defendants probably will fail to assert the right
only because they are unaware of the demand
requirement. Under such circumstances, it cer-
tainly is plausible to argue that failure by coun-
sel to inform his client of this basic defense
violates the defendant's sixth amendment right
to adequate assistance of counsel. 6 This inac-
tion by counsel constitutes plain error which the
court may raise sua sponte. 9'
2. Likelihood of Inducing a Guilty Plea
Some critics of the Act have expressed the
view that defendants, hoping that the govern-
ment will not be ready for trial within the 100
day period, will refrain from entering into plea
dividual with the commission of an offense shall
be filed within thirty days from the date on
which such individual was arrested or served
with a summons in connection with such
charges.
95 Id. § 3162(a)(2).
96 See generally Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d
687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. DeCoster,
487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Coles v. Peyton,
389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968). Writing for the
Beasley court, Judge Celebrezze stated:
We hold that the assistance of counsel required
under the Sixth Amendment is counsel reasona-
bly likely to render and rendering reasonably
effective assistance. It is a violation of this stan-
dard for defense counsel to deprive a criminal
defendant of a substantial defense by his own
ineffectiveness or incompetence .... Defense
counsel must perform at least as well as a lawyer
with ordinary training and skill in the criminal
law and must conscientiously protect his client's
interest, undeflected by conflicting considera-
tions .... Defense counsel must investigate all
apparently substantial defenses available to the
defendant and must assert them in a proper and
timely manner.
491 F.2d at 696.
" FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) provides that "plain
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the atten-
tion of the court."
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negotiations with the prosecutionYs The conse-
quence of this refusal to plea bargain, these
commentators contend, will be the creation of
an enormous backlog, which will render both
courts and prosecutors incapable of complying
with the statutory time limits. Thus, countless
defendants will be released without ever being
brought to trial.
The possibility of this prediction coming to
fruition is remote. During the implementation
of the Second Circuit Plan which required de-
fendants to be tried within six months, the
number of guilty pleas appears actually to have
increased. 9 But more relevant to the present
inquiry is whether the court should consider
any effect that a dismissal permitting reprose-
cution will have on the plea bargaining process.
The answer must be that this factor is immate-
rial. The goal of the Act is to bring defendants
promptly to trial, not to coerce them to plead
guilty. Although the term "coercion" may ap-
pear somewhat strong in this context, it is ap-
propriate in this setting.
Given the alternatives of pleading guilty to a
lesser included offense and receiving a rela-
tively lenient sentence or taking his chances that
the court may dismiss with prejudice, the de-
fendant's decision is a difficult one. But when
the accused knows that the court will probably
dismiss without prejudice in an attempt to en-
hance the plea negotiation process, he is then
confronted with a different kind of choice.
Rather than face the anxiety and prejudice at-
" See 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., at 7447. As stated by then Attorney
General Saxbe:
Our system of criminal justice presently depends
on the guilty plea. Under this bill, criminals who
would ordinarily plead guilty may insist on jury
trial to take advantage of the automatic dismissal
after sixty days. The system would be over-
whelmed and wholesale dismissals would follow.
99 Replying to Attorney General Saxbe's criticisms
of the Act, Congressman Conyers, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Crime, stated:
[T]he Attorney General is of the opinion that
enactment of this legislation would result in a
decrease in the number of guilty pleas, since
defendants would request jury trials with
greater frequency.... As a matter of fact, the
experience of the Second Circuit after the impo-
sition of speedy trial limitations coupled with a
dismissal sanction was quite to the contrary.
During the first fall quarter after the rules be-
came effective, the rate of disposition increased
twenty percent, all due to increased guilty pleas.
Id. at 7450.
tending reprosecution, the invitation of a re-
duced charge and a light sentence is appealing.
The giving of such a plea under these condi-
tions is inherently involuntary. Neither the
Speedy Trial Act nor the American judicial
process was created for the purpose of inducing
defendants to plead guilty. Rather, a guilty plea
should be accepted by the court only if it is
freely and intelligently tendered."°
3. Ability of the Prosecution to Try the Defendant
After the Expiration of the Act's Time Periods
In determining whether to dismiss with or
without prejudice, the court should not con-
sider that the prosecution would be ready to
bring the accused to trial shortly after the ter-
mination of the statutory time periods. For ex-
ample, suppose that the prosecution states that
although it was unable to comply with the time
limits, it would be ready to try the defendant
within the next ten days. This consideration is
relevant only to the granting or denying of a
continuance under the Act'0' and not to the
determination of dismissing with or without
prejudice. Analysis under the dismissal with or
without prejuice provision is prohibited be-
cause in almost every case the government
could argue that if the court would dismiss the
proceeding without prejudice, it would be able
to comply with the statutory time limits the
second time around. Under such circum-
stances, there would be little incentive for the
government to comply when it first arrested or
"00 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970),
where Mr. Justice White stated:
That a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be
accepted only with care and discernment has
long been recognized. Central to the plea and
the foundation for entering judgment against
the defendant is the defendant's admission in
open court that he committed the acts charged
in the indictment. He thus stands as a witness
against himself and he is shielded by the Fifth
Amendment from being compelled to do so-
hence the minimum requirement that his plea
be the voluntary expression of his own choice.
But the plea is more than an admission of past
conduct; it is the defendant's consent that judg-
ment of conviction may be entered without a
trial-a waiver of his right to trial before a jury
or a judge. Waivers of constitutional rights not
only must be voluntary but must be knowing,
intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely conse-
quences....
Id. at 748.
101 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B).
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indicted an accused. Courts should therefore
refrain from considering the government's as-
sertion that it will be ready to try the defendant
shortly after the expiration of the Act's time
limits in determining whether to dismiss with or
without prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to ana-
lyze the dismissal with or without prejudice
provision of the Speedy Trial Act and to recom-
mend a proposed interpretation in construing
that provision. It must be emphasized that this
sanctions provision provides the crucial inquiry
under the Act. Unless the government is given
an adequate incentive to comply with the statu-
tory time periods, the Act will become a nullity.
The government, believing that courts will dis-
miss with prejudice only under the most ex-
treme circumstances, will be under no compul-
sion to diligently pursue its prosecutions.
Rather, only by a vigorous judicial application
of the remedy of dismissal with prejudice will
the prosecution be deterred from noncompli-
ance with the time limits. The primary consid-
eration for the courts must be that although
society may suffer to some extent by the release
of defendants under circumstances prohibiting
reprosecution, this result sometimes is neces-
sary if the Act is to achieve the goals for which it
was enacted.
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